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Abstract: The surge of economic nationalism and cross-border technology 
investments foreshadows disputes between inbound investors and host 
governments. While cross-border technology transfer is essential for economic 
development in many countries, host governments retain the right to safeguard 
citizens against potential consequences of such investments. The tension 
between these two concepts provides a significant challenge to the future of 
foreign direct investment and the global economy. For these reasons, legislators 
and arbitrators must develop and enforce regulations that protect public 
interests while enabling investors to successfully operate in the host country. In 
anticipation of these disputes, this article will explain how arbitral tribunals can 
use structured proportionality to accomplish this objective. More specifically, 
this article explains the causes of upcoming disputes, introduces a 
proportionality analysis of the government’s right to regulate and the degree to 
which the investor’s rights are threatened, and demonstrates how the consistent 
implementation of a structured proportionality test will maximize the chances 
that regulators and arbitrators will find balanced solutions that account for the 
interests of all stakeholders of FDI projects. 
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The current international investment climate is marked by two major 
trends that collide to increase risk exposures for foreign investors in the 
digital economy. First, ill-prepared, undefined regulatory frameworks for 
innovative technological products and services expose investors to policy 
changes that prevent them from implementing their business models. 
Second, political shifts toward protectionist policies provide government 
officials with the political will to implement such regulations. 
When multinational enterprises (MNEs) introduce new products and 
services into a sovereign economy where no regulatory framework exists, 
legacy local businesses pressure host government officials to put in place 
burdensome barriers to entry. These barriers often amount to regulatory 
expropriation and investors are forced to file for arbitration. Still, 
governments have the right and obligation to regulate investment climates 
to protect their citizens from negative impacts of such products and 
services.2 
Debates about the merits of foreign direct investment projects and the 
policies that regulate them often devolve into sweeping conclusions about 
cross-border transactions. Such arguments fail to consider case-specific 
variables that ultimately determine the net effects of each project. Case-
specific details also help arbitrators and regulators identify regulatory 
options that safeguard host countries without decimating investors’ business 
models.3 Although there is an emerging discourse on regulatory 
frameworks for the sharing economy, the literature has not confronted a 
critical element: the role of judges and arbitrators in enforcing such 
regulations. This article will explore ways in which the decisions of arbitral 
tribunals can account for the interests of both parties to technology 
disputes.4 Moreover, it will explain how a framework for reviewing arbitral 
challenges to regulations can provide an effective bridge to policymakers 
whose regulations can prevent the need for contentious proceedings. 
When foreign investors challenge a host government’s regulations, 
they often pursue claims through investor-state dispute settlement (ISDS). 
Arbitral reviews and case decisions not only impact the interested parties, 
but they also draw a figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable 
                                                          
 2 In the context of cross-border expansions in the digital economy, software platforms 
threaten privacy and numerous other public interests that government officials are 
responsible for regulating. The tension between neo-liberals that support free trade and 
investment and anti-globalists who want to protect the absolute sovereignty of host 
governments lies at the center of the globalization debate. 
 3 See generally Benjamin J. Edelman & Damien Geradin, Efficiencies & Regulatory 
Shortcuts: How Should We Regulate Companies Like Airbnb and Uber? 19 STAN. TECH. L. 
REV. 293, 295 (2016). 
 4 A thorough review of multiple databases revealed no hits for searches of articles on 
this topic. While there has been a white paper on the topic, the author could not find any that 
discuss the topic ISDS and recent innovations in the sharing economy. 
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regulations, sending a clear message to regulators and investors in future 
projects.5 Based on these considerations, this article will argue that 
arbitrators should consistently use the structured proportionality doctrine to 
assess investor claims and identify balanced regulations that safeguard the 
public and allow investors to generate a profit. In addition to finding the 
most equitable outcome, structured proportionality analysis will guide and 
encourage legislators and regulators to implement reasonable regulations 
that prevent disputes. Utilizing a test that provides consistent, foreseeable 
outcomes will also maximize the chances that parties reach a compromise 
in the cooling off period. 
In anticipation of ISDS cases involving foreign investor technology 
claims, this article provides a rubric for resolving regulatory disputes. 
Section I explains why there is a significant likelihood for conflicts between 
foreign technology investors and host governments. Section II uses case 
studies of Airbnb and Uber in new markets to provide anecdotal examples 
of overbroad, one-sided regulations that prevent investors from succeeding; 
these case studies also show more balanced regulations that provide 
investors with a platform to succeed while also safeguarding the public 
from negative externalities. Having differentiated acceptable regulations 
from those that are overbroad and unacceptable, Section III explains why 
ISDS will be the venue for investors to claim that certain regulations breach 
the protections under international investment agreements (IIA). Next, the 
article identifies the different methods that ISDS tribunals use to analyze 
claims of regulatory expropriation and argues that tribunals should 
implement proportionality analysis in cross-border technology disputes. In 
order to further explain how proportionality analysis will examine treaty 
claims, Section IV explains the different forms of balancing and 
proportionality that domestic courts and international tribunals use to 
examine challenges to regulatory interference. Section V revisits the case 
studies to demonstrate how and why structured proportionality analysis 
encourages balanced regulations and provides many positive outcomes for 
all stakeholders in foreign direct investment projects. 
I. CROSS-BORDER TECHNOLOGY INVESTMENT: THE 
IDEOLOGICAL FAULT LINES 
The regulation of technology investments is a necessary component of 
the new digital economy.6 Innovations are creating services and products 
that provide new threats to the environment, consumer safety, and the well-
                                                          
 5 David Gaukrodger & Kathryn Gordon, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: A Scoping 
Paper for the Investment Policy Community 14 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 
2012/03, 2012), http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/5k46b1r85j6f-en. 
 6 See generally Stanislaw Drozd, Poland: Investment Disputes in the Era of the Fourth 
Industrial Revolution, MONDAQ (Apr. 10, 2018), http://www.mondaq.com/x/690234/
international+trade+investment/Investment+Disputes+In+The+Era+Of+The+Fourth+
Industrial+Revolution; Edelman, supra note 3, at 294-95 n.1. 
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being of third parties. For example, Uber’s original process for screening 
new drivers was less thorough than those of its counterparts in the taxi 
business, who have significant restrictions to ensure safety.7 Similarly, 
Airbnb’s platform connects tourists with property owners whose facilities 
are not checked with the same level of scrutiny required of hotel owners.8 
In both cases, host government regulators need to adopt new regulations 
that protect the safety of consumers and third parties. Because government 
officials are responsible for regulating a service that has never been 
regulated, there is a strong likelihood of conflict between investors and 
government officials responsible for protecting the public good. 
A. Uncertainty of Regulatory Framework 
Regulatory climates are likely to change after technology investors 
have entered foreign markets. For example, when Uber penetrated the 
Chinese market in 2010, the host government did not have regulations for 
ride sharing services; thus, shortly after its arrival in China, the host 
government developed and implemented regulations that precluded Uber 
from executing an essential component of its business model.9 Soon 
thereafter, Uber decided to terminate its multi-billion dollar investment in 
China and sold its interests in the platform to a local competitor.10 When 
Uber entered the market, such regulations did not exist because Uber was 
the seminal investor of this innovation. 
B. Highly Regulated Industries 
While the uncertainty of regulatory frameworks leaves investors 
exposed to new regulations that impede business models, the highly 
regulated industries in which they operate leave investors exposed to many 
regulations that will impact their investments. In highly regulated 
industries, the success of foreign direct investment projects often hinges on 
                                                          
 7 Luz Lazo, Cab Companies Unite against Uber and Other Ride-Share Services, 
WASH. POST (Aug. 10, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/local/trafficandcommuting/
cab-companies-unite-against-uber-and-other-ride-share-services/2014/08/10/11b23d52-1e3f-
11e4-82f9-2cd6fa8da5c4_story.html?utm_term=.f373e81f497b. 
 8 Ally Marotti, Hotel Industry Group Says Airbnb Hosts Running “Illegal Hotels,” CHI. 
TRIB. (Mar. 9, 2017) http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-airbnb-hotel-report-0310-
biz-20170309-story.html; Reity O’Brien, Hotel Industry Targets Upstart Airbnb in 
Statehouse Battles, CTR. PUB. INTEGRITY (Jul. 21, 2015), https://www.publicintegrity.
org/2015/07/15/17649/hotel-industry-targets-upstart-airbnb-statehouse-battles; see generally 
Erich Eiselt, Airbnb: Innovation and Its Externalities, The Mun. Law. Mag., Nov.-Dec. 
2014, at 6. 
 9 Zheping Huang, China Finally Made Ride-Hailing Legal, in a Way that Could 
Destroy Uber’s Business Model, QUARTZ, (July 29, 2016), https://qz.com/745337/china-
finally-made-ride-hailing-legal-in-a-way-that-could-destroy-ubers-business-model/; William 
C. Kirby, The Real Reason Uber is Giving Up in China, HARV. BUS. REV., Aug. 2, 2016, 
https://hbr.org/2016/08/the-real-reason-uber-is-giving-up-in-china. 
 10 Id. 
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the efficiency of the regulatory frameworks.11 A s a result, incumbent 
companies support and work with lobbyists and other government relations 
strategists to advocate for favorable policies that are disadvantageous for 
companies in the digital arena.12 These ongoing relationships between 
regulators and incumbents paired with the uncertainty of frameworks that 
threaten foreign investors’ success in the technology sector often cause 
problems for foreign investors who are new to the market. These problems 
can lead to arbitral disputes between investors and host governments.13 
C. Foreign Investors and the Populist Surge 
The reemergence of economic nationalism has been a significant 
geopolitical development. From Brexit to President Trump’s victory in the 
United States, we have seen a geopolitical recession that has reversed 
globalization’s tide in the direction of the nation-state and its 
municipalities.14 Foreign investors are a common enemy for nationalist host 
governments and their constituencies. More specifically, nationalist host 
governments blame many of the host country’s economic and social 
problems on foreign investors who exploit their labor and resources. For 
this reason, the retreat of global forces has compelled sovereign and sub-
sovereign governments to adopt protectionist and overbroad policies that 
favor local investors over their foreign competitors.15 While disputes 
between foreign investors in the technology sector have not yet reached the 
tribunals of investor-state arbitration, it is only a matter of time before they 
                                                          
 11 OECD, Main Determinants and Impacts of Foreign Direct Investment on China’s 
Economy 14 (OECD Working Papers on Int’l Inv., No. 2000/04, 2000), 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/321677880185; Drozd, supra note 6; Economy Rankings, THE 
WORLD BANK: DOING BUSINESS: MEASURING BUSINESS REGULATIONS (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:34 
P.M.), http://www.doingbusiness.org/rankings. 
 12 Christopher Elliott, Someone’s Trying to Kill Turo, Airbnb and Uber. Here’s Why It 
Matters, FORBES (Oct. 6, 2018, 9:45 AM), https://www.forbes.com/sites/christopherelliott/
2018/10/06/someones-trying-to-kill-turo-airbnb-and-uber-heres-why-it-matters/
#235306933745; Aaron Short, The Sharing Economy is New York’s Hottest Political War 
Right Now, CITY & STATE N.Y. (May 15, 2018), https://www.cityandstateny.com/articles/
policy/policy/sharing-economy-new-yorks-hottest-political-war-right-now.html. 
 13 Drozd, supra note 6. That said, regulators play an important role in managing market 
failures and maximizing the benefits of foreign investments. To find an ideal arbitral 
mechanism, it is essential to understand the bona fide regulations and those that are 
implemented to protect incumbents against foreign investors. 
 14 Lazo, supra note 7; Robert Ginsburg, Measuring Trump’s FDI Impact, FDI 
INTELLIGENCE (Apr.-May 2017). 
 15 Christoph Sprich, Growing Protectionism in Foreign Direct Investment, BDI (Apr. 
18, 2016) https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/growing-protectionism-in-foreign-direct-
investment/; see, e.g., Mahitha Lingala & Tridivesh Singh Maini, FDI in India on Slippery 
Ground? Protectionism, Populism to Blame, QUINT (Apr. 17, 2019), https://www.
thequint.com/voices/opinion/foreign-direct-investment-india-trend-protectionism-populism-
2019-elections. 




Three components present high-risk exposures for cross-border 
technology products: 1) uncertainty about which regulations will be 
executed, 2) projects that require significant regulation, and 3) surging 
nationalist sentiment. Surging nationalist sentiment fuels anti-investor 
sentiment among local competitors which provides the impetus for 
regulatory discrimination. The industries that require significant regulatory 
activity provide government officials with ample opportunity to execute 
regulations that impair foreign investors’ abilities to implement their 
business models. Finally, the lack of regulations existing at the time of the 
seminal investment makes it difficult for investors to anticipate and adjust 
to such discriminatory regulations. These three factors combine to create 
significant regulatory risk exposure for foreign investors in the digital 
economy. 
II. PROTOTYPICAL ASPECTS OF CROSS-BORDER TECHNOLOGY 
INVESTMENTS 
Software platforms provide significant efficiencies to markets in 
which technology companies operate.17 That said, they also threaten public 
interests that regulators and other government officials safeguard. Because 
of new technology disruptions to host country economies, international 
business experts predict many conflicts between foreign investors and the 
governments regulating them.18 The challenge for regulators is to harness 
the positive aspects of such technology, refrain from implementing 
measures that serve to protect industry incumbents and exclude 
competitors, and safeguard against the innovation’s threats to public 
interest. This requires an understanding of the positive and negative 
externalities of such products, the drivers of regulatory conflict, and the 
distinction between unfair, protectionist and bona fide, merit-based 
regulations. 
Airbnb and Uber are pioneers of cross-border investments in the new 
digital economy. Airbnb is an online hospitality marketplace for short-term 
lodging, and Uber is a global transportation technology company. Both use 
platforms to connect service providers and consumers, serving as 
illustrative examples of leading innovators in the new digital economy.19 
The case studies below demonstrate the problems these companies have 
experienced with regulators in U.S. and foreign cities. While this paper 
focuses on cross-border disputes, it uses foreign and domestic case studies 
                                                          
 16 Drozd, supra note 6; Gerhard Wegen & Stephan Wilske, Introduction, GETTING THE 
DEAL THROUGH, (2018) https://gettingthedealthrough.com/area/3/article/29061/arbitration-
2017-introduction/. 
 17 Drozd, supra note 6; Edelman, supra note 3, at 296. 
 18 Drozd, supra note 6; Edelman, supra note 3, at 313 
 19 Edelman, supra note 3, at 294. 
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to provide examples of overbroad and nuanced regulations. The types of 
problems in the digital economy are universal. 
A. Positive Aspects 
The benefits of innovative products and services in the digital 
economy focus on resource efficiency, enhanced access to information for 
buyers and sellers, and increased accountability for service providers and 
consumers.20 These benefits should be protected, rather than threatened, by 
regulations. 
1. Reducing Transaction Costs 
Modern software platforms minimize the costs and simplify the 
process associated with finding a suitable transaction counterpart. For 
example, rather than having to find a taxi driver who is available and 
willing to take the fare, Uber’s transportation platforms provide the public 
with access to available drivers who are in close proximity to passengers. 
21More specifically, the application enables Uber passengers “to hail a car 
from any location and have it arrive within minutes.”22 
2. Reputation and Safety 
Many digital platforms also offer important information to service 
providers and their clients about each other. For example, if a passenger is 
rude or unhygienic or a tenant damages property, platforms can issue a 
warning to alert future service providers or even disable the customer’s 
account. Conversely, passengers can read reviews of their drivers from 
previous passengers. With a mechanism to hold consumers and service 
providers accountable to each other, digital platforms encourage actors to 
behave appropriately and expose those who do not.23 
3. Pricing Efficiencies 
By providing current information that is frequently updated to reflect 
market conditions and by facilitating open communication among all 
parties, software platforms help companies set prices that reflect volatile 
levels of supply and demand. As a result, these platforms maximize pricing 
efficiencies and enable services providers to meet higher demands.24 For 
example, in times of significant demand, higher rates ensure sufficient 
                                                          
 20 Id. at 296. 
 21 Mohamed S. Jalloh, Uber: Advantages and Disadvantages, INVESTOPEDIA (Apr. 17, 
2019), https://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/110614/taxi-industry-pros-cons-
uber-and-other-ehail-apps.asp. 
 22 Id. 
 23 Edelman, supra note 3, at 296 
 24 Id. at 301. 
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supply by encouraging drivers to work instead of pursuing other activities. 
While the benefits of technology transfer have been chronicled for 
years, digital platforms and related innovations provide new advantages to 
economies. The three benefits explained above are merely a sample of these 
new enhancements. 25 For these reasons, legislators and judicial branches of 
governments are encouraged to develop and enforce regulations that 
harness these innovations. 
B. The Regulatory Debate: Protectionist vs. Bona Fide and Protectionist 
Regulations 
The conflict between governments and investors in the digital 
economy mirrors the competing interests in ISDS cases. More specifically, 
these conflicts place those who advocate for investor’ property rights 
against those who support a host government’s right to regulate. In the 
context of ISDS, foreign investors usually argue that regulations violate the 
host government’s commitments under international investment treaties.26 
Conversely, host governments argue that restrictions on their rights to 
regulate violate the sovereignty of nations.27 A review of domestic and 
international investment projects between digital investors and host 
governments reveals that some regulations are narrowly tailored and merit-
based measures that protect the host country from potential consequences of 
the technology.28 However, in other cases, the challenged regulations can be 
overbroad and often serve to protect the interest of local competitors who 
are losing business to foreign investors.29 
1. Bona Fide Regulations 
Host governments often play a critical role in devising regulations that 
maximize the public good associated with different aspects of technology. 
                                                          
 25 Id. 
 26 Regulation: New Orleans Area, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/new-
orleans/resources/nola-regulation/ (last visited Apr. 21, 2019); Vehicle Requirements: San 
Francisco Bay Area, UBER, https://www.uber.com/drive/san-francisco/vehicle-requirements/ 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 27 Nasser Mehsin Al-Adba, The Limitation of State Sovereignty in Hosting Foreign 
Investments and the Role of Investor-State Arbitation to Rebalance the Investment 
Relationship (2014) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, University of Manchester), 
https://www.research.manchester.ac.uk/portal/files/54553070/FULL_TEXT.PDF. 
 28 Edelman, supra note 3 at 313; see Digital Disruption and the Sharing Economy, 
DIGITAL FINANCE ANALYTICS BLOG (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:54 P.M.), 
http://digitalfinanceanalytics.com/blog/category/sharing-economy/ (outlining regulations 
applicable to Uber). 
 29 See Growing Protectionism in Foreign Direct Investment, BDI (Sept. 13, 2018, 7:58 
P.M.), https://english.bdi.eu/article/news/growing-protectionism-in-foreign-direct-
investment/; Edelman, supra note 3 at 307. Greenberg Center for Geoeconomic Studies, The 
Rise of Digital Protectionism: Insights from a CFR Workshop, COUNCIL FOR. REL. (Sept. 13, 
2018, 7:57 P.M.), https://www.cfr.org/report/rise-digital-protectionism. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:171 (2019) 
180 
One of the most important regulatory objectives in the digital economy is to 
remedy market failures.30 Market failures are some set of interactions and 
relationships that prevent market transactions from adequately serving the 
interests of everyone concerned.31 Regulations are necessary for correcting 
market failures and promoting public policy interests and should be upheld. 
In the context of Uber, government officials are ostensibly interested in 
regulating safety concerns related to the condition of the automobile and the 
skills of the driver.32 In order to minimize problems associated with these 
issues, many governments require drivers to undergo extensive background 
checks and require that every vehicle undergo inspections to ensure that it is 
structurally sound. These regulations, which also apply to taxi drivers, are 
reasonable because they are tailored to meet a specific policy interest. For 
these reasons, they are not protectionist. 
2. Protectionist Regulations 
While many regulations help protect consumers and the public from 
the potential negative impact of business activity, others are often 
implemented to protect industry incumbents from competition of new 
entrants to the market. These regulations often benefit the regulated firms 
more than the consumers for whom the restrictions are supposed to be 
implemented. Regulators often become closely linked to the firms they 
regulate, through extended interactions, parallel career trajectories, or 
mutual desires to maintain the status quo.33 In some cases, the influence of 
companies in a regulated sector is powerful enough to provide a situation in 
which the regulator is the entity that is being regulated. In such cases, 
regulations are more likely to be overbroad and/or implemented to favor 
local investors over foreign competitors.34 
C. Case Studies; Uber and Airbnb 
After experiencing initial rounds of success in their cross-border 
expansions, Airbnb and Uber ran into significant roadblocks. Complaints 
from hotel owners and taxi drivers whose margins were falling and other 
constituents who were upset about surging rental prices and excessive 
congestion compelled government officials to take action.35 While 
                                                          
 30 Market failures are “some set of interactions and relationships that prevent market 
transactions from adequately serving the interests of everyone concerned.” Each innovation 
brings different externalities to the industry or local economy that regulators must address. 
Edelman, supra note 3 at 309. 
 31 See Edelman, supra note 3 at 309. 
 32 Adrienne Roberts, Uber Crash Highlights Growing Safety Concerns: Pedestrians, 
WALL ST. J. (Mar. 23, 2018), https://www.wsj.com/articles/uber-crash-highlights-growing-
safety-concern-pedestrians-1521810000. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Edelman, supra note 3 at 307. 
 35 Marotti, supra note 8; Airbnb’s Legal Troubles: What Are the Issues?, THE 
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regulators in cities such as Barcelona and Berlin implemented policies that 
actively discouraged homeowners from renting their homes, regulators in 
Asia and Europe implemented policies that interfered with Uber’s ability to 
launch operations and compete with local taxi companies.36 Conversely, 
there are other examples in which regulators developed policies that were 
tailored to address market failures and promote public policy interests. For 
example, in San Francisco and San Diego, authorities implemented 
regulations to stop rent inflation by preventing hosts from posting more 
than one listing on Airbnb’s website.37 
1. Uber: Nuanced Measures Directed at the Problem vs. Minimizing Usage 
or Protectionism 
The ostensible objectives of host governments that regulate Uber and 
its drivers are vehicle safety, driver integrity, and insurance gaps for drivers 
who do not have adequate coverage.38 Uber’s experiences in France provide 
an example of situations in which host governments pass unreasonable 
regulations that are likely implemented for protectionist purposes.39 When 
expanding into France, Uber experienced initial success, triggering dissent 
from local competitors and demonstrations from non-government 
organizations. In response to the demonstrations against the noise problems 
and adverse impact on local rental prices, the French Parliament passed a 
series of laws known as “Loi Thévenoud.”40 This law imposed regulations 
that are not reasonably connected to consumer protection concerns. Loi 
Thévenoud precluded “transport vehicles with drivers” (a category 
developed for covering transportation platforms, including Uber) “from 
being geo-localized by users before reservation.” Under this restriction, 
Uber users in France cannot use their smartphones to locate drivers before 
making a reservation with a specific driver. In addition to prohibiting 
“geolocalization,” the law also prohibits Uber drivers from driving 
consecutive passengers without returning to their base in between rides, if 
the second passenger has not made a reservation. This causes delays in 
                                                                                                                                      
GUARDIAN, July 8, 2014, https://www.theguardian.com/travel/2014/jul/08/airbnb-legal-
troubles-what-are-the-issues/; see also Ambreen Ali, Different Regulatory Tactics Lead to 
Success for Sharing Economy Startups Uber, Airbnb, 1776 (Sept. 13, 2018, 8:08 P.M.), 
https://www.1776.vc/insights/different-regulatory-tactics-lead-to-success-for-uber-airbnb/. 
 36 Tracey Lien & David Pierson, Uber is the Latest U.S. Tech Company to Face 
Regulatory Backlash in Europe, L.A. TIMES (Nov. 10, 2017), https://www.
latimes.com/business/technology/la-fi-tn-tech-europe-20171110-story.html. 
 37 Carolyn Said, Airbnb Loses Thousands of Hosts in SF as Registration Rules Kick in, 
SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE (Jan. 14, 2018, 6:00 AM), https://www.sfchronicle.com/
business/article/Airbnb-loses-thousands-of-hosts-in-SF-as-12496624.php?psid=hBuu. 
 38 See, e.g., Margaret Bree, New Background Check Regulation Tackles Ride-Sharing 
Safety, THE HEIGHTS (Mar. 17, 2016), http://bcheights.com/2016/03/17/new-background-
check-regulation-tackles-ride-sharing-safety/. 
 39 Edelman, supra note 3 at 306-09. 
 40 Id. at 306. 
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pickup times and can result in the loss of passengers for drivers who are 
using resources such as gas and time. 
Regulation experts in the digital economy noted that there is not a 
meritorious objective in implementing this policy, consequently concluding 
that it exists to obstruct ride-sharing companies.41 This regulatory scheme 
solely serves to impede drivers’ abilities to be near passengers who are 
scattered throughout the city. In fact, passengers of Uber taxis are helped 
(rather than harmed) when drivers are drawn to areas of high demand. 
When a regulatory framework, such as Loi Thévenoud, complicates the 
product’s ability to serve locals and provides no inherent benefit to either 
the market or the public, it is likely a protectionist regulation. In fact, in 
some cities, government officials openly admit that regulations are 
motivated by protectionist objectives.42 
Whereas Loi Thevenaou provides an example of regulations that are 
not reasonably related to the stated objective, others focus on overbroad 
regulations that deter or terminate the consumer’s ability to use software 
platforms. 43 Alternatively, regulators in Australia and Washington, D.C. 
chose to address insurance gaps with tailored regulations. Rather than 
banishing Uber in certain areas, Australian regulators sought to eliminate 
insurance gaps with legislation that prevents non-commercial insurance 
policies from paying claims from transportation activity associated with 
Uber’s digital platform.44 Regulators in Washington D.C. addressed safety 
concerns by requiring Uber drivers to undergo thorough background checks 
that include ongoing communication between the digital platform’s staff 
                                                          
 41 Id. at 307. 
 42 See, e.g., Marcin Goclowski, Poland May Impose More Regulations on Uber, 
REUTERS (June 14, 2017), https://www.reuters.com/article/uber-poland-regulations/poland-
may-impose-more-regulations-on-uber-idUSL8N1JB1N1 (noting “[t]he judge issued the 
ban, the equivalent of a temporary injunction, on the grounds that Uber was deemed to be 
causing damage to the taxi industry”); Al Goodman, Spanish Judge Imposes Temporary Ban 
on Uber Taxi Service, CNN (Dec. 9, 2014), https://www.cnn.com/2014/12/09/world/
europe/spain-uber-court-ban/index.html (explaining that ban was imposed because Uber was 
causing damage to the taxi industry). 
 43 Associated Press, Uber Seeks Legal Advice After New South Wales Suspends 
Registration of 40 Cars, GUARDIAN (Sept. 27, 2015), https://www.theguardian.com/
technology/2015/sep/28/uber-seeks-legal-advice-after-40-new-south-wales-drivers-
suspended; Greg Dickinson, How the World is Going to War with Uber, TELEGRAPH (June 
26, 2018), https://www.telegraph.co.uk/travel/news/where-is-uber-banned/. 
 44 Rideshare Insurance Requirements, UBER (Sept. 13, 2018, 8:14 P.M.), 
https://www.uber.com/en-AU/drive/insurance/ (outlining regulations for Australian drivers). 
The gaps in insurance were caused (in part) by the drivers’ expectations that their 
noncommercial liability coverage would respond to Uber related claims. By disallowing the 
motivated driver to purchase commercial coverage that does not respond. Roberts, supra 
note 32; Matt Rogers, Uber and Suffocating Government Regulations, INT’L POLICY DIGEST 
(Sept. 23, 2017), https://intpolicydigest.org/2017/09/23/uber-and-suffocating-government-
regulations/. 
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and the FBI.45Unlike the regulations in Loi Thevenaou, these regulations 
serve a clear purpose. By performing background checks, authorities are 
screening potential drivers without preventing those with clean records 
from driving. Regulators in Washington D.C. and Australia implemented 
more tailored regulations that address related concerns without a significant 
intrusion into the investor’s property rights. Ultimately, these regulations 
allow the public to benefits from the positive aspects of the innovation 
while minimizing the impact of the negative aspects. 
2. Airbnb: Nuanced Measures vs. Minimizing Usage with Blunt Tools 
In the context of Airbnb, regulators’ ostensible objectives are to reduce 
traffic in and out of rented units, reduce inflated residential and commercial 
rental rates due to increased housing demand, and address housing 
shortages for residents who cannot compete with the prices speculators are 
willing to pay.46 
(a) Fort Worth 
Several cities in the United States have mitigated their exposure to 
Airbnb-related problems by providing stringent regulations for homeowners 
who want to use the site for additional income. Through these stringent 
measures, host cities mitigate the problems by significantly reducing the 
number of hosts who use them. For example, in Fort Worth, Texas 
regulators require potential Airbnb hosts to apply for a bed and breakfast 
exception to the rule that prohibits short-term rentals for under 30 days in 
residential areas. 47 .48 Bed and breakfasts are commercial entities subject to 
a number of stricter regulatory requirements with which residential entities 
need not comply.49 Therefore, Airbnb applicants in Fort Worth must make 
sure that their rental properties have standard commercial safety equipment 
                                                          
 45 Faiz Siddiqui, Uber Threatens to Pull Out of Maryland if State Requires Fingerprint-




 46 Gaby Hinsliff, Airbnb and the So-Called Sharing Economy is Hollowing Out Our 
Cities, GUARDIAN (Aug 31, 2018, 3:06 AM), https://www.theguardian.com/
commentisfree/2018/aug/31/airbnb-sharing-economy-cities-barcelona-inequality-locals; 
What Regulations Apply to My City?, AIRBNB, https://www.airbnb.com/help/article/961/
what-regulations-apply-to-my-city (last visited Apr. 21, 2019). 
 47 https://www.star-telegram.com/news/local/community/arlington/article210174114.
html 
 48 Id. 
 49 See Fort Worth Ordinance 21653. The ordinance says, in making a determination if a 
property is being used as a short-term home rental, the definition for “transient or short-term 
resident” is reviewed and if the duration of the stay is less than 30 days, that use is not 
allowed since it is more analogous to a bed or breakfast home which is allowed in a two-
family zoning district by special exception. 
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and that they meet specific structural and parking requirements.50 These 
regulations—including door widths, safety stairs, sprinkler systems, and 
access points—often require homeowners to make structural adjustments to 
their homes if they want to rent their homes out on Airbnb.51 Other 
regulations include onerous parking regulations and staffing requirements: 
Fort Worth’s hosts must provide a parking space for every guest who stays 
in the home.52 Hosts who have multiple guests and live in an urban areas 
(including Fort Worth) are unable to meet this requirement and, 
consequently, cannot host through Airbnb. For hosts who want to rent out 
their homes for supplemental income, the financial and time investments 
required to rent out their homes outweigh the potential benefits. 
Conversely, traditional bed and breakfast owners and hotels, whose primary 
incomes come from housing guests, are more than happy to comply with 
such regulations. With less incentive to register with Airbnb, the supply of 
available rental units diminishes, and consequently, so do the financial, 
noise, and pollution problems that cities need to regulate. While these broad 
regulations are effective at mitigating the negative consequences, they 
provide a very significant intrusion on the property rights of potential hosts 
who are discourage from using the platform. In sharp contrast to the 
regulators in Fort Worth, San Francisco has developed tailored regulations 
for managing problems associated with home sharing.53 
(b) San Francisco 
City officials in San Francisco have spent a significant amount of time 
listening to complaints from city residents about Airbnb’s negative impact 
on the local real estate market. The surge in rental prices and the related 
shortage of available housing is a direct result of the real estate investors 
buying properties as investments and renting them out to visitors.54 
Speculators who buy and rent their homes as hotels are buying many of the 
                                                          
 50 Id. Chapter 5.106 is the bed and breakfast home regulation, which also refers to 
additional requirements of Chapter 4, Articles 6 and 8 of the city’s zoning ordinance. 
http://fortworthtexas.gov/planninganddevelopment/zoning/ordinance/5_100.pdf?v=2016-05-
20 
 51 These requirements can be found in Chapter 4, Article 6 of Fort Worth’s Zoning 
Ordinance. 
 52 Id. 
 53 There are myriad examples of cities using problem-specific measures to regulate 
Airbnb. See, e.g., Leonard Cohen, Airbnb and Municipal Zoning Regulation, HOST 
COMPLIANCE (Sept. 13, 2018 9:12 P.M.), https://hostcompliance.com/resources-gallery/
2016/6/5/airbnbregulation (discussing how, in order to mitigate the financial problems 
associated with Airbnb, the city council voted to legalize home-sharing services and 
partnered with Airbnb to launch its Shared City Initiative, which has agreed to help Airbnb 
renters collect taxes on behalf of the city). 
 54 Sarah Holder, The Airbnb Effect: It’s Not Just Rising Home Prices, CITYLAB (Feb. 1, 
2019), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2019/02/study-airbnb-cities-rising-home-prices-tax/
581590/. 
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available units without any intention of living in them.55 Consequently, this 
boost in demand is driving the price of real estate up. Unlike Fort Worth, 
San Francisco sought to deal with problem head-on without relying on 
antiquated policies that discourage overall usage. In order to deal with the 
rent scarcity problem, San Francisco developed two nuanced rules for 
short-term rentals. First, the city implemented a rule that struck at the core 
of the speculator’s business model. In order to rent their homes to visitors, 
the homeowner must live in the unit (home or apartment) for at least 275 
days per year.56 This requirement aims directly at the business model of 
speculators. With this rule in place, real estate entrepreneurs cannot 
purchase multiple facilities and rent them out without residing in them for a 
significant amount of time. Rather, they can only rent out the one facility in 
which they reside for the minimum number of days. Eager to close any 
loopholes, regulators in San Francisco implemented a 90-day rule, which 
limits the total number of days that a host can rent out his/her place without 
actually being present in the house.57 Real estate entrepreneurs seeking to 
make significant amounts of money through Airbnb will be discouraged 
from buying multiple homes if they can only rent out those homes for one-
quarter of the year. Violators who continue to rent out their apartments 
beyond the 90 days are subject to significant fines. While San Francisco 
developed significant regulations for Airbnb users, its tailored framework 
stands in sharp contrast to the onerous and overbroad regulations of Fort 
Worth. In fact, hostcompliance.com, an independent consultancy that helps 
governments with short-term rental policies, praised San Francisco’s highly 
regulated, but workable, framework. According to hostcompliance.com, 
“San Francisco should serve as a model for the way municipalities think 
about Airbnb.”58 
(c) San Diego 
A review of independent reports and expert commentary reveals that 
San Diego’s regulators and residents favor compromises rather than 
endorsing extreme policies that either ban Airbnb or allow it to operate 
without restrictions.59 In 2016, R Street, a think tank in Washington, D.C., 
issued a report ranking different cities’ Airbnb regulations according to the 
                                                          
 55 Curtis Hearn, How to Invest in AirBnB Property (with Investment Calculator), SMART 
MONEY NATION (Mar. 7, 2018), https://smartmoneynation.com/invest-airbnb-property/. 
 56 Stephen Fishman, Overview of Airbnb Law in San Francisco, NOLO 
https://www.nolo.com/legal-encyclopedia/overview-airbnb-law-san-francisco.html. 
 57 Id. 
 58 Cohen, supra note 53. 
 59 Andrew Moylan, Roomscore 2016 Short-term Rental Regulation in US Cities, R 
STREET 12 (Mar. 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/RSTREET55.
pdf; Steven Greenhut, San Diego Council Chief trying to quickly push through Airbnb ban R 
STREET (November 2016), https://www.rstreet.org/2016/11/01/san-diego-council-chief-
trying-to-quickly-push-through-airbnb-ban. 
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user-friendliness of their policies. Citing user-friendly regulations such as 
those that allow speculators to own and rent multiple homes, R Street gave 
the highest possible grade of “A” to San Diego.60 However, complaints 
from residents and hotel owners compelled policy makers to shift the 
regulatory needle toward more restrictive policies.61 While the debate over 
the proper remedies ensued, politicians and residents alike agreed that 
regulatory compromises were the best solution.62 These new rules 
addressed the problems of scarcity in home supply and inflated rent by 
limiting the number of units that lessors can rent to one.63 Although the new 
regulations are more stringent than preexisting policies, they are tailored to 
rent inflation and to specific geographical areas that experience scarcity in 
available homes. More specifically, additional requirements are placed on 
lessors who aim to list properties that are located in both more popular 
coastal areas and in the downtown area.64 By reserving this stringent 
measure for areas that have the most serious problems, the Council 
refrained from endorsing blanket policies that ignore geographic 
differences. This helps regulators manage the problem without 
unnecessarily restricting hosts in areas where the problems are less 
pronounced. 
III. DIFFERENT TESTS FOR REVIEWING REGULATORY 
CHALLENGES AND WHY FET IS BEST 
Many of the conflicts arising out of the regulations of cross-border 
digital investment will focus on disagreements between foreign investors 
and host governments. In cases where the host state has entered into a 
bilateral investment treaty (BIT) with the home country, inbound investors 
will have a direct cause of action against the host government. For this 
reason, many of the formal disputes between these parties will take place in 
investor-state arbitral tribunals. In promising to provide certain protections 
(including fair and equitable treatment) to investors from the home country, 
the parties to the investment treaties consent to arbitrations when conflicts 
cannot be resolved amicably.65 
                                                          
 60 Id. at 10. 
 61 Lori Weisberg & Rob Nikolewski, San Diego council votes to limit Airbnb rentals to 
primary residences only, The San Diego Union-Tribune (Jul. 16, 2018), 
https://www.sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sd-fi-airbnb-council-20180715-
story.html. 
 62 Greenhut, supra note 59. 
 63 Lori Weisberg & Rob Nikolewski, San Diego council votes to limit Airbnb rentals to 
primary residences only, The San Diego Union-Tribune (Jul. 16, 2018), https://www.
sandiegouniontribune.com/business/tourism/sd-fi-airbnb-council-20180715-story.html. 
 64 Additional requirement prevents users from renting out their apartments to guests 
who stay two nights or less; Jennifer Sokolowsky, San Diego City Council Approves Strict 
New Airbnb Rules (July 2018), https://www.avalara.com/mylodgetax/en/blog/2018/07/san-
diego-city-council-approves-strict-new-airbnb-rules.html. 
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A. Bilateral Investment Treaties and Investor-State Arbitration 
BITs comprise two kinds of protections: general protections that 
promise certain standards of treatment and specific protections, where 
governments promise not to implement certain types of measures that 
impact foreign investors from the home country.66The substantive 
protections include promises to adhere to the national treatment and most 
favored national standards, in addition to requiring payment of 
compensation for expropriation and measures “tantamount to 
expropriation.”67 
General protections provide foreign investors with guarantees to 
adhere to basic standards of treatment. The most fundamental principle of 
non-discrimination, which is comprised of the most-favored nation 
principle (MFN) and national treatment (NT) principle, forms the basis of 
treaty provisions that speak to discriminatory regulations.68 MFN stipulates 
that a signatory country to a BIT should receive the same benefits as 
investors from the home country.69 Similarly, NT states that non-nationals 
should be treated no worse than nationals. Protections include measures 
against specific actions including the inability to convert and transfer funds 
as well as the nationalization of foreign investments. While these provisions 
of international investment treaties are specifically designed to distinguish 
between protectionist and merit-based regulations, there is a significant 
limitation to their applicability.70 In order to bring a claim of discrimination 
under a BIT, the claimant must identify investments that were made in like 
circumstances. Although in some cases the issue of likeness is simple, it is 
often more difficult to meet this requirement. In the case of cross-border 
technology investments, the investor is often the innovator of the product or 
services and consequently, could not satisfy this jurisdictional requirement. 
B. Fair and Equitable Treatment and Relative Protections 
While regulations can be challenged under the specific and general 
protections of international investment treaties, the broadest and most 
                                                                                                                                      
Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes, U.N. CTAD/EDM/Misc.232/Add.2 (2003); Cf. 
WALLACE DUGAN ET AL., INVESTOR STATE ARBITRATION219-246. (Oxford University Press, 
2008). 
 66 Brenna Evans, Najia Mahmud, & Robert Ginsburg, Investor-State Dispute Settlement: 
What Canadian Practitioners Need to Know, in ANNUAL REVIEW OF CIVIL LITIGATION 229 
(Todd Archibald ed., 2018) (whereas the home country is the county in which the foreign 
investor resides, the host country is a country in which the actual investment takes place); 
https://forum.wordreference.com/threads/host-country-and-home-country.1972361/. 
 67 OECD, “Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to Regulate” in International 
Investment Law 44 (Org. Econ. Cooperation & Dev., Working Paper No. 2004/04, 2004); 
Dugan, supra note 65, at 442–43, 450–51. 
 68 See Dugan, supra note 65, at 397 
 69 See id. at 414. 
 70 See Dugan, supra note 65, at 413 
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common challenges to government measures are filed under the Fair and 
Equitable Treatment clause (FET).71 Claimants use the FET standard as 
their primary mechanism for challenging government measures that 
negatively impact their investments.72 Arbitrators use the standard as a 
multi-purpose umbrella principle that allows them to invoke and apply a 
wealth of sub-principles. The broad scope of the FET enables tribunals to 
consider a wider range of factors than is possible under the relevant test for 
direct and indirect expropriations. The analyses of many FET claims focus 
on investor perspectives of the host governments’ actions. Examples of a 
sub-principles FET analysis include, but are not limited to: good faith; 
access to justice and due process; regulatory transparency; non-
arbitrariness; nondiscrimination and reasonableness; and the investor’s 
legitimate expectations.73 
Unlike MFN and NT clauses that focus exclusively on a comparative 
analysis of host governments’ treatment of investors, the FET clause 
sometimes allows consideration of conflicting interests between investors’ 
property rights and host governments’ rights to regulate. Arbitrators who 
focus on the collision of investor property rights with a host government’s 
right to regulate investment climate use a proportionality principle to 
determine which principle should prevail in cases arising from international 
investment treaties. 
C. Legitimate Expectations: The Investor’s Perspective 
One of the most common principles invoked under the FET standard is 
that of legitimate expectations.74 The FET standard is violated when the 
investor is deprived of its legitimate expectation.75 Many assessments of an 
investor’s legitimate expectations examine the facts of a case through the 
claimant’s lens at the time of the investment and, consequently, use an 
absolute perspective to determine outcomes.76 In the 2004 Occidental v. 
Ecuador award, the tribunal stated, “there is certainly an obligation not to 
alter the legal and business environment in which the investment has been 
made.”77 Three years later, the tribunal in Parkerings v. Lithuania stated, 
                                                          
 71 Dugan, supra note 65, at 493. 
 72 Matthew C. Porterfield, A Distinction Without a Difference? The Interpretation of 
Fair and Equitable Treatment Under Customary International Law by Investment Tribunals, 
Investment Treaty News (Mar. 22, 2013), https://www.iisd.org/itn/2013/03/22/a-distinction-
without-a-difference-the-interpretation-of-fair-and-equitable-treatment-under-customary-
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 73 Dugan, supra note 65, at 491-540. 
 74 Fair and Equitable Treatment, UNITED NATIONS CONFERENCE ON TRADE AND 
DEVELOPMENT 10 (2012), https://unctad.org/en/Docs/unctaddiaeia2011d5_en.pdf. 
 75 Id. at 63. 
 76 Id. at 65-66. 
 77 GEBHARD BUCHELER, PROPORTIONALITY IN INVESTOR-STATE ARBITRATION 200 (1st 
ed., 2015). 
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“[t]he Fair and Equitable Treatment standard is violated when the investor 
is deprived of its legitimate expectation that the conditions existing at the 
time of the agreement would remain unchanged.” 78 By focusing on the 
reasonableness of an investor’s expectations, the scope of the examination 
implies that legislative changes that go against an investor’s reasonable 
expectations will lead to liability under the FET provision.  
D. Proportionality and the Collision of Principles 
While some tribunals focus on the investor’s perspective, a minority of 
tribunals do not consider the FET standard to be absolute. According to 
Francesco Francioni, “a progressive interpretation of the ‘fair and equitable 
standard...’ entails that the investor who seeks equity for his investment’s 
protection must also be accountable, under equity and fairness principles, to 
the host state’s population affected by the investment.”79 As early as 2006, 
the Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic tribunal’s interpretation 
of the fair and equitable treatment standard stated that the host 
government’s interest should be considered as well.80 In Saluka, the tribunal 
determined: 
In order to determine whether frustration of the foreign investor’s 
expectations was justified and reasonable, the host State’s legitimate 
right subsequently to regulate domestic matters in the public interest 
must be taken into consideration as well...[t]he determination of a 
breach of Article 3.1 by the Czech Republic therefore requires a 
weighing of the Claimant’s legitimate and reasonable expectations 
on one hand and the Respondent’s legitimate regulatory interests on 
the other.81 
Multiple tribunals have reinforced the notion that proportionality 
should be used to review FET claims.82 In 2010, the Lemire tribunal 
elaborated on the concept of balancing the interests of multiple 
stakeholders.83 More specifically, it stated that the Fair and Equitable 
Treatment analysis should consider: the State’s sovereign right to pass 
legislation and to adopt decisions for the protection of public interests, 
especially if they do not provoke a disproportionate impact on foreign 
investors, legitimate expectations of the investor, at the time he made his 
                                                          
 78 Parkerings-Compagniet AS v. Republic of Lithuania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/8, 
Award, ¶ 330 (Sept. 11, 2007). 
 79 Alex Stone Sweet, Investor-state Arbitration: Proportionality’s New Frontier, 4 J. L. 
& ETHICS HUM. RIGHTS 48, 62 (2010). 
 80 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCTRAL-PCA Case, ¶ 304-06 
(Mar. 17, 2006). 
 81 Saluka Investments BV v. The Czech Republic, UNCTRAL-PCA Case, ¶ 304-06 
(Mar. 17, 2006). 
 82 See generally, Bucheler, supra note 77, at 193. 
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investment, the investor’s duty to perform an investigation before effecting 
the investment, and the investor’s conduct in the host country.84 
Proportionality is a legal doctrine that is perfectly suited for reconciling 
conflicting interests on a case-by-case basis. In addition to citing case law, 
arbitrators have opined that FET state action must be proportionate.85 Using 
the proportionality test to review the collision of principles with rights on a 
case-by-case basis, arbitral panels can ensure that the “detriment to one of 
the values involved is no greater than factually and legally necessary for the 
purposes of the other.”86 
E. Proportionality with a Caveat 
The enhanced benefits of imminent disputes between foreign investors 
in the digital economy require alternative approaches to reviewing 
challenges to regulations. As mentioned above, software platforms enhance 
pricing efficiencies, lower transaction costs, and enhance safety related to 
services and products by encouraging and requiring transparency and 
accountability.87 Conventional proportionality reviews weigh the host 
country’s need for regulations against the degree with which it interferes 
with an investor’s rights.88 The enhanced benefits of technological 
innovation merit a new approach, rather than an exclusive focus on the 
negative externalities of inbound investments More specifically, arbitral 
tribunals should account for the positive impacts of such investments when 
arbitral claims demonstrate that relevant regulations threaten to eliminate 
them. 
IV. BALANCING AND PROPORTIONALITY: BASICS OF 
STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY 
While there are many ways to apply the FET standard in ISDS cases, 
there are also multiple forms of proportionality. A review of proportionality 
jurisprudence in different parts of the world reveals that different countries 
implement different forms of proportionality analysis in the context of 
constitutional disputes.89 The primary distinction between these approaches 
is reflected in the way that arbitrators weigh the government’s intrusion 
upon the right against the public good that it aims to accomplish. 
                                                          
 84 Joseph Charles Lemire v. Ukraine, ICSID Case No. ARB/06/18, Int’l Investment 
Agreement, ¶ 285 (Jan. 14, 2010); see also Bucheler, supra note 77, at 200. 
 85 Other arguments in favor of using proportionality analysis to review FET claims 
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Specifically, countries including the United States and South Africa follow 
an approach that considers multiple factors and strikes a balance that courts 
use differently from case to case.90 In other nations that employ a structured 
proportionality test, courts implement a more rigid, sequenced examination 
that applies each step of the test in the original order.91 While there are 
minor differences between each country’s implementation of structured 
proportionality tests, they all follow a similar path. 
A. An Overview of Structured Proportionality 
Structured proportionality is a doctrine that comprises a trigger clause 
and three additional steps to determine the constitutionality of a given 
measure.92 First, the court examines whether the law’s objective is 
legitimate, and whether to trigger the subsequent scrutiny into the 
constitutionality of the government measure. Under structured 
proportionality analysis, the process of reviewing the law’s objective 
(hereafter the “trigger clause”) serves as the gateway to a three-step inquiry 
focused on the relationship between the means and ends of the legislation 
and the degree of the intrusion on the relevant right. 
Canadian courts provide a great example of structured proportionality 
review. Canada’s version of the trigger clause first examines whether an 
investor’s right is being infringed. If an infringement of interests protected 
by a right occurs, then the constitutionality of the means used is examined 
through a three-step inquiry into: (a) rationality, (b) minimal impairment, 
and (c) proportionality “as such.”93 Whereas the first two steps of this test 
focus on means-ends analysis, the third step provides a comparison of the 
marginal improvement between two regulations and the marginal intrusion 
of the investor’s rights between them.94 
1. Rationality 
While jurisdictions may use different forms of the rationality clause, 
all examine the relationship between means and ends. As opposed to the 
trigger clause, which focuses on the merits of the government objective, 
this step focuses on the means chosen to meet the government objective. 
During this element of the analysis, the courts identify and often reject 
means that are overly broad or not reasonably related to the ends. While the 
implementation of this step varies, most measures that satisfy the trigger 
clause also pass the rationality analysis.95 
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2. Minimal Impairment 
The minimal impairment step focuses on the balance of the 
alternatives for meeting the government interest. In practice, courts look to 
see if there are less restrictive alternatives that can achieve the same 
government objective as the challenged measure.96 If the claimant cannot 
demonstrate that the less restrictive alternative equally advances the law’s 
purpose, the challenged measures will remain in place. Consequently, many 
alternatives that effectively protect the public good (but not as effectively as 
the original) and provide less intrusive options regarding the claimant’s 
rights are not sufficient to overturn the challenged measure. 
3. Proportionality “As Such” 
Proportionality “as such” is part of a doctrine that prioritizes the right 
of the investor and the extent to which the right is being intruded upon, 
putting the burden of justification on the government. Unlike the first two 
steps (rationality and minimal impairment) that focus exclusively on the 
means-ends analysis, this step requires a direct comparison between the 
severity of the government measure and the extent to which the measure 
infringes on the investor’s rights.97 The proportionality “as such” step 
compares the need for the challenged measure and its effectiveness with the 
extent to which the investor’s right is infringed.98 For this reason, 
government measures that pass the rationality and minimal impairment 
steps often fail to satisfy the proportionality “as such” step. Although less 
formal versions of proportionality provide more latitude to decision makers 
about the form of analysis, the strict footprint of structured proportionality 
ensures that arbitrators and judges will follow the same line of inquiry. 
B. Alternatives to Structured Proportionality 
Unlike the jurisdictions mentioned above, the principle of 
proportionality is not firmly established in U.S. jurisprudence. That said, 
several concepts in U.S. constitutional law perform a de facto examination 
of factors similar to those balanced in South African courts.99 U.S. courts 
balance and weigh factors in many contexts, including the dormant 
commerce clause and cases concerning the First Amendment. Like the 
minimal impairment analysis, U.S. jurisprudence often uses a “less 
restrictive means” analysis to determine whether the government measure 
was sufficiently tailored to its purpose.100 The result is that judges look to 
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 97 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3116-17; Grimm, supra note 93, at 389. 
 98 Id. 
 99 Id. at 3100. 
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see if there is a net impact favoring the plaintiff or the government. 
In countries, like South Africa, where courts implement a multifactor 
analysis, the factors are not individual, ordered steps; instead, they are part 
of an overall balancing exercise that the courts use to determine an 
outcome.101 While the factors provide guidance to judges who can often 
select which factors on which to focus, judges in countries that use 
structured proportionality are required to consider every factor in a specific 
order.102 The accountability brought by a rigid and comprehensive 
proportionality test ensures that all factors that need to be considered are 
included in the judicial analysis. 
C. Why Structured Proportionality is the Best Option 
The following section explains how the third step of the 
constitutionality analysis often produces different outcomes from balancing 
and multifactor tests that do not incorporate this step. Next, it provides two 
reasons why this should be applied in technology disputes under ISDS. 
1. The Proportionality “As Such” Step: The Difference Maker 
Only through this step does the court take full account of the severity 
of deleterious effects of a measure on individuals or groups. 103 The real 
consideration is how deeply the right is infringed. Other considerations 
include: the seriousness of the danger that the law is preventing and the 
likelihood that the danger will materialize. 
By going beyond rationality and minimal impairment, the 
proportionality “as such” test can make the doctrine more rigorous than 
strict U.S. scrutiny or any interpretation of the multi-factor test, which ends 
after the least restrictive means test. In the seminal Canadian dispute 
involving structured proportionality, Chief Justice Dickson explained that: 
Even if an objective is of sufficient importance, and the first two 
elements of the proportionality test are satisfied, it is still possible 
that, because of the severity of the deleterious effects of a measure 
on individuals or groups, the measure will not be justified by the 
purposes it is intended to serve. The more severe the deleterious 
effects of a measure, the more important the objective must be if the 
measure is to be reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society.104 
By including the “as such” proportionality test, structured 
                                                                                                                                      
3118. In fact, U.S. courts tend not to specify whether this analysis requires that the measures 
being compared “equally advance” the compelling government interest. 
 101 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3099-3100. 
 102 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3120. 
 103 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3116-17. 
 104 Id. 
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proportionality will maximize the chances of finding an alternative that 
protects the public good without precluding its success and provide a better 
bridge and judicial check against legislation. 
2. Structured Proportionality: Maximizing Chances of Finding Balanced 
Alternative 
The Beit Sourik Village Council vs. Government of Israel dispute 
from the Israeli courts illustrates an example in which the third step of 
structured proportionality provides a different outcome from that which is 
provided by less formal tests without the third step. In cases such as the 
Beit Sourik case, structured proportionality provides more reasonable 
outcomes than those that are reviewed without the third step. 
A dispute between the state of Israel and Beit Sourik demonstrates 
how the proportionality “as such” clause provides outcomes based on 
compromise.105 This case, which focuses on the conflict between the 
security of Israelis in occupied territories and Palestinian access to 
farmland, appeared in front of the Israeli High Court of Justice. While this 
case focuses on international humanitarian law, it demonstrates how a 
rigorous application of the “as such” step provides balanced solutions that 
protect the public good and respect landowners’ and foreign investors’ 
rights. 
In 2005, Israel’s government withdrew from most of its settlements in 
the Gaza Strip. Still, Israel maintained some of its settlements in the West 
Bank that were expanded and controlled under military rule. Seven years 
later, Israel began building a large wall, or separation fence, along the West 
Bank that was intended to separate Israel’s West Bank settlements from the 
rest of the territory.106 While an armistice line authorized the building of a 
“wall,” parts of the fence reached beyond the authorized space and 
separated Palestinian inhabitants from their farmland. 107The lawsuit’s 
proceedings, which challenged the Israeli Defense Force’s (IDF) attempt to 
extend its ownership of territory, concluded that a fence, infringing on less 
Palestinian territory in the West Bank, could simultaneously protect the 
Israelis and allow inhabitants access to their farmland.108 As the following 
overview explains, the third step of the test enabled the court to reach this 
decision. 
The Israeli Court’s review of the first three steps upheld the IDF’s 
original demarcation of the outlines for the fence.109 First, the Israeli High 
                                                          
 105 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.), 
translated in 38 ISR. L. REP. 83 (2005). 
 106 HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] (Isr.). 
 107 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3118. 
 108 Id.; HCJ 2056/04 Beit Sourik Vill. Council v. Gov’t of Israel 58(5) PD 807 [2004] 
(Isr.). 
 109 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3118. 
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Court of Justice determined that Israeli protection against violent attacks 
from the occupied territory was a legitimate purpose for building a fence.110 
Next, the Israeli Court concluded that the government’s decision to place 
the fence near the top of a mountain was a rational step toward that 
objective.111 In the third step, Israel’s original placement of the fence 
survived the minimal impairment analysis because any lower alternative 
placement along the hill that provided a less severe infringement upon 
Palestinian access to farmland would not provide as much security. In the 
third step, the court explained that a “less restrictive means” referred only 
to an alternative that equally advanced the law’s purpose while intruding 
less on rights.”112 
While the location of the fence passed the minimal impairment step of 
the test, the Court’s strict application of proportionality “as such” produced 
a different outcome that required Israelis to move the fence to a location 
lower than the original placement that represented a lesser intrusion of 
Palestinian human rights. More specifically, the Court held that the 
marginal improvement to security and protection of Israeli civilians from 
the original line to the lower location was far less than the marginal 
intrusion on Palestinian human rights imposed by the higher location.113 A 
test that stops after minimal impairment analysis had ruled that the fence’s 
higher location should remain in place because the lower location would 
not be as effective in protecting Israelis. However, when comparing the 
marginal improvement of the higher with the lower location to the marginal 
intrusion on Palestinians’ rights to access their farmland, the Court found 
that a lower location should be the final placement.114 This is a prime 
example of how the structured proportionality test maximizes the chances 
of finding solutions that simultaneously promote public interests and 
respect the rights of individuals or groups who are the object of the 
government’s measures. 
V. PROPORTIONALITY “AS SUCH” USING AIRBNB AND UBER 
EXAMPLES: THE CASE FOR STRUCTURED PROPORTIONALITY 
Ultimately, arbitrators’ decisions convey a message about the 
figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable measures to legislators 
and regulators who develop and enforce regulations and parties affected by 
them. While the tailored regulations are not as effective as their broad-brush 
alternatives, they are significantly less intrusive into users’ and providers’ 
rights. Arbitral tribunals that examine cases through the “as such” lens are 
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less likely to uphold overbroad measures than those who use the less formal 
approach to proportionality. 
A. Uber and the “As Such” Approach 
Onerous licensing requirements and de facto banishments of Uber 
drastically mitigate the number of injuries to passengers and, consequently, 
the number of claims to insurance companies for compensation. For this 
reason, these measures pass the first two steps of the constitutionality 
inquiry. The significant reduction of Uber-related problems decrease of 
Uber drivers and trips produced measures that provide less restrictive 
measures on investors’ rights. While background checks and tailored 
insurance requirements will ameliorate Uber’s safety concerns, they will 
likely not be as effective as onerous licensing requirements that would 
significantly reduce the number of drivers and the number of safety related 
incidents. For this reason, the licensing requirement will pass the first two 
steps. The third step inquiry, however, would provide a different outcome. 
The third step requires a direct comparison between the marginal 
improvement of broad regulations that improve safety and uninsured claims 
by minimizing overall usage of the application to the marginal intrusion on 
those would be prevented from driving and passengers who could not use 
the service. 
Conversely, the marginal improvement of requisite inspections and 
background checks (as opposed to none) are greater than the marginal 
intrusion on drivers who must undergo said inspections and checks. While, 
the blunt measures that minimize usage would not pass.step 3, the nuanced 
regulations would be upheld. . 
B. Airbnb and the “As Such” Approach 
Fort Worth, as referenced above, has adopted traditional regulatory 
requirements for Airbnb users that should be more effective at reducing 
Airbnb-related problems than problem-specific regulations. In spite of the 
fact that tailored regulations are the more balanced alternative, a 
proportionality test that does not include the “as such” prong might not 
identify this option and will uphold the broad regulations. As the graphic 
below demonstrates, the structured proportionality test would likely 
produce a different outcome. The marginal improvement in noise reduction, 
inflated rent, and housing shortages from traditional bed and breakfast 
regulations that would diminish the usage of Airbnb does not outweigh the 
marginal intrusion on investors’ rights between minimizing overall usage 
and implementing nuanced regulations. Therefore, the current Fort Worth 
measure blunt measures would not pass the “as such” step.  
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                Airbnb   
Step 1: Are requirements that Airbnb lessors use bed and 
breakfast requirements effective at reducing noise 
pollution and inflated rent problems? 
Yes 
Step 2: Are there less restrictive alternatives to stringent 
Bed and Breakfast regulations and are other measures 
that minimize usage equally effective at fixing such 
problems [group them together]? AND 
 
No 
Step 3: Which is greater: the marginal improvement to 
affordable housing shortages and noise concerns from 
citywide licensing requirements, as compared to 
regulations tailored to area requirements OR the 
marginal intrusion on investors’ rights to citywide 






The graphic above does not encapsulate the calculus of every 
upcoming dispute. Rather, it demonstrates how the structured 
proportionality test maximizes the probability that arbitrators will identify 
and encourage more balanced alternatives that recognize the interests of 
additional stakeholders. For example, in the San Francisco context, the 
structured proportionality test would likely uphold the measures that are 
tailored to ensure that hosts only post one listing. The marginal 
improvement to affordable housing shortages of such regulations would be 
greater than the marginal intrusion on homeowners who want to rent out 
multiple homes on Airbnb 
C. Benefits of Structured Proportionality: The Bridge 
The “as such” analysis does not provide a framework solely for 
arbitral tribunals to identify balanced regulations. The decisions of the 
courts and tribunals are a bridge to the decision-making processes of 
legislators, regulators, and investors. While the decisions of government 
officials play a role in framing risk exposures in all foreign direct 
investments, the disruption of digital economy projects elicits significant 
involvement of host government regulators. From developing regulations 
that accommodate new products, to working with incumbents to provide an 
effective and equitable investment climate, legislative officials are primary 
actors in the cross-border digital economy. For these reasons, the consistent 
application of structured proportionality principles will provide a judicial 
backstop to legislative decisions that encourage merit-based regulations.115 
                                                          
 115 Jackson, supra note 88. 
Northwestern Journal of 
International Law & Business 39:171 (2019) 
198 
However arbitral inquiries into the purpose and legality of the regulations 
and the “as such” comparison step is much more than a judicial backstop: 
they provide “opportunities for the legislature to reflect on and improve its 
own legislative product.”116 
The consistent application of the three steps in structured 
proportionality provides an explicit model for legislators and other 
government officials in their decision-making: 
Legislators who understand that statutes will be evaluated under 
proportionality standards if challenged as infringing on individual 
constitutional rights will have reason to give attention to the 
rationality of the means, to whether there are other means less likely 
to intrude on rights, and to whether the gains to be achieved are 
weightier and of such a character as to warrant intrusions on 
protected freedoms.117 
In addition to helping legislative officials understand the court or 
tribunal’s rubric for decision-making, consistent usage of structured 
proportionality helps investors assess and manage risks related to their 
projects. More specifically, an investor entering an emerging market 
country who understands a tribunal’s process for determining the legality of 
regulations will be able to make many important decisions that impact all 
stages of the investment. For example, scenario-planning is a fundamental 
risk management strategy that companies use to manage country risk. 
Those companies who plan for such risks identify the different ways in 
which government decisions will affect their ability to implement their 
business model. When such decision-makers are equipped with the tools to 
understand the type and scope of regulations that are likely to be passed by 
legislators and regulators, they can better prepare and develop a course of 
action for responding to them. This process is an essential component of 
succeeding in emerging markets. 
D. Compromise in Cooling-off Period 
Another example of the use of structured proportionality that helps 
investors anticipate the legality of disputed regulations takes place in 
cooling-off periods. Cooling-off periods are also known as a feature of the 
Bilateral Investment Treaty (BIT) and ISDS.118 Parties seeking to initiate 
arbitration proceedings are required to attempt to reach an amicable 
                                                          
 116 Insisting on proper purpose and legal authority focuses attention on the central role of 
legislatures in authorizing and limiting government conduct that affect investors’ rights. 
 117 Jackson, supra note 88, at 3146. 
 118 See Joachim Pohl, Kekeletso Mashigo & Alexis Nohen, Dispute Settlement 
Provisions in International Investment Agreements: A Large Sample Survey, 7 
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settlement that would avoid the need for contentious proceedings.119 While 
the number of days for a cooling-off period varies, all treaties require that 
both parties enter mediation or some other form of consultation during 
which they are encouraged to explore reasonable options for an amicable 
settlement.120 After a good-faith effort has failed to produce an amicable 
settlement, the claimant is authorized to file for arbitration.121 The 
consistent application of structured proportionality in technology disputes 
will draw a figurative line between those that are effective but fail to 
respect investor rights and those that are sufficiently effective and 
respectful of the infringed rights. If the parties identify this figurative line 
and understand that arbitrators are likely to enforce it, they will have a 
better understanding of the likely arbitration outcome and a clearer picture 
of their negotiating positions and leverage. With a clear understanding of 
these positions and the likelihood of success in contentious proceedings, the 
parties will maximize the chances of reaching a settlement in the cooling-
off period.122 
CONCLUSION 
The current trends of digital expansion and resurgent populist 
sentiment foreshadow a significant number of disputes between inbound 
investors and host governments. The outcomes of these disputes will not 
only determine the fate of the parties in a given case but will also send a 
clear message to similarly situated investors who are considering cross-
border expansions and to legislators who regulate them. Polarized debates 
about threats to sovereignty and the merits of low investment barriers 
prevent stakeholders from considering the facts of each case before taking a 
position. In many cases, there are regulatory options that respect 
sovereignty and the investors’ rights. In the upcoming disputes, arbitral 
panels must endorse such nuanced regulations to ensure that host countries 
and investors enjoy the benefits of their investments. Structured 
proportionality provides the solution to do just that. Unlike other versions 
of proportionality, structured proportionality always compares the degree to 
which the government’s measure impedes the investment’s success with the 
degree to which it provides a nuanced approach that is practical. The 
consistent use of this test will demarcate a figurative line between 
acceptable and unacceptable regulations. With a clear understanding of the 
difference between reasonable, tailored regulations and blunt measures that 
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 122 The formal, sequenced implementation of structured proportionality helps investors 
understand the figurative line between acceptable and unacceptable regulations. Because the 
ambiguity of the less formal test provides the parties with less guidance about the 
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do not consider investors objectives, governments will be able to develop 
balanced regulatory alternative that avoid the need for contentious 
proceedings. In situations where conflicts arise, parties to disputes who 
understand the figurative line will be more likely to reach a compromise. 
Finally, the more balanced alternative will also help host governments 
attract FDI and the benefits of technology transfer. 
 
